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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
ANA LILIA GONZALEZ, 
De fendant/Appe11ant. 
Case No. 900552-CA 
Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-35-26(2)(a) (Supp. 1989) and Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1989), whereby a defendant in a district 
court criminal action may take an appeal to the Court of Appeals 
from a final judgment and conviction for any crime other than a 
first degree or capital felony. 
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The pertinent parts of the following statutes and 
constitutional provisions are provided in Addendum A: 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 
Utah Code Am. § 76-6-502 
Utah R. Evid. 402 
Utah R. Evid. 403 
Utah R. Evid. 801(c) 
Utah R. Evid. 803(3) 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Did the evidence establish that the defendant acted with 
a purpose to defraud when she completed the writing of another? 
(i.e. did the defendant rely, in good faith, on the perceived 
authority?) This Court reviews the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the verdict, and reverses a conviction where "the 
evidence and its inferences are so 'inconclusive or inherently 
improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which he was 
convicted.,n State v. Moore, 147 Utah Adv. Rep. 28, 31 (Utah App„ 
1989) (citation omitted). 
2. Did the trial court err when it prohibited a witness 
from testifying about a matter critical to, and corroborative of, the 
defendant's defense? ,f[T]rial court rulings on the admissibility of 
evidence are not to be overturned in the abscmce of a clear abuse of 
discretion." State v. Griffiths, 752 P.2d 879, 883 (Utah 1988). "To 
constitute an abuse of discretion, the error must have been 
harmful." State v. Larson, 775 P.2d 415, 419 (Utah 1989) (citations 
omitted); cf. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967) (error must 
be "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt"). 
3. Did the trial court err when it admitted an exhibit 
irrelevant to, and unconnected with, proof of the crime charged? The 
abuse of discretion standard cited above applies here as well. 
4. Did the trial court err when it refused the defendant's 
jury instruction on reasonable doubt? This issue involves a question 
of law, with appellate courts granting "no particular deference to 
- 2 -
the trial court's ruling." State v. Pedersen. 150 Utah Adv. Rep. 10, 
12 (Utah App. 1990). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction for 
Forgery, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-6-501 (1978 & Supp. 1989), in the Third Judicial District Court 
in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable J. Dennis 
Frederick, Judge, presiding. The Court sentenced 
Defendant/Appellant Ana Gonzalez to an indeterminate prison term of 
one to five years and ordered her to pay various court ordered 
amounts. (R 79-80). The Court then stayed the prison sentence, 
imposing instead an 18 month period of probation. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On January 20, 1990, following a day at work, a co-worker 
of Ana Gonzalez invited her to a party in the Capitol Hill area. 
(T 107, 124). Ms. Gonzalez accepted, arriving at the party around 
8:00 or 9:00 p.m. (T 107). 
While she was there, Ms. Gonzalez met a woman named Shannon 
O'Neill1 who boasted openly about how she had used her sister's 
checking account to buy some clothing. (T 108, 122). According to 
Ms. O'Neill, her sister permitted Shannon to use the checkbook on a 
1
 During the trial, the parties referred to Ms. O'Neill 
as "Sherry" O'Neill and "Shannon" O'Neill. (T 108, 125-26, 152). 
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loan-type basis. (T 108). Many individuals situated nearby, 
including Ana Gonzalez and Jeff Phillips, overheard Ms. O'Neill's 
loud and boastful remarks. (T 108, 137). 
Ana Gonzalez remained at the party for only a short period 
of time. (T 109). Before she departed, Ms. O'Neill asked Ana for 
some money to buy beverages and snacks. (T 109). Since Ana had 
already decided to leave, she agreed only to loan Ms. O'Neill "a 
couple [of] bucks.11 (T 109). Ana then left, deciding to return the 
next morning for her money. (T 110). After visiting a friend, Ana 
returned to her sister's house for the evening. (T 124). 
At approximately 8:00 a.m. the next day, Ana drove back to 
see Shannon O'Neill. Although Ms. O'Neill did not have the money, 
she offered to pay Ana with the proceeds of a check. (T 111-12). 
Shannon asked Ana to buy some groceries with the check, complete it 
for an amount exceeding the bill, and then pay herself back with 
part of the change returned. (T 112). Ana agreed, recognizing that 
her mother had allowed her to perform similar tasks in the past. 
(T 106-07, 134). 
Approximately one and a half years ago, when Ana was 16 
years old and without her own checking account2, h€>r mother loaned 
Ana a checkbook and check guarantee card for occasional purchases. 
(T 133-34). Pursuant to her mother's authority, Ana would select 
2
 Ana Gonzalez did not, at any time thereafter, open her 
own checking account. (T 105). 
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an item, produce the check guarantee card, and then complete the 
check. (T 106, 134). No problems ever arose. (T 106). 
Consequently, when Ana went to the supermarket ("Smith's"), 
she had no reason to believe that Ms. O'Neill's requests were 
improper. (T 112). Accompanying Ana were four individuals: 
"Eric"; "Brenda"; Brenda's child; and an unnamed male. (T 112). 
Upon their arrival at Smith's, Brenda pulled out a shopping 
cart and strolled down the aisles. (T 113). While the two men 
placed groceries and various body building items in the cart, Brenda 
would stop for make-up and cosmetics. (T 113). Ana asked them if 
their selections were too expensive. In response, they assured Ana 
they would pay back Ms. O'Neill. (T 115). Ana did not take 
anything for herself. 
The items amounted to $262.28. (T 48). The unidentified 
man told Ana that $300 would be an appropriate amount for the 
check. (T 59). While Ana proceeded to pay the amount, the man and 
Brenda (and the baby) left the store with the groceries. 
(T 50-51). After completing3 the check, Ana gave the cashier the 
check, a Smith's card, and a check guarantee card. (T 47-48). 
Although the cashier noticed nothing "unusual about Ms. Gonzalez's 
behavior," the quantity and quality of goods caught the cashier's 
attention. (T 56-57) . The cashier wrote the necessary information 
3
 At trial, the parties disputed whether Ms. Gonzalez did 
in fact sign the involved check. For purposes of this appeal, 
Ms. Gonzalez concedes that there was sufficient evidence to support 
her signing of the check. (T 62, 145). 
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on the back of the check and then gave it to the assistant manager 
(Richard Anderson) for verification. (T 50). 
Mr. Anderson called the number on the check, watching Ana 
Gonzalez and Eric through out the duration of the phone call. 
(T 62, 70). Anderson conceded, however, that Ana "just stood there 
at the checkstand[.]" (T 70-71). In fact, even when Anderson 
"hollered" at his assistant to grab the groceries until he could 
determine if the check would clear, Ana simply waited by the 
checkstand. (T 71, 73). 
By comparison, Eric "started to run off" though he was 
quickly detained by store personnel. (T 119). The other two 
individuals (and the baby) "jumped in the car and left [without the 
groceries]." (T 68). Ana did not at any time attempt to "escape." 
(T 73). 
Having completed his phone call, Richard Anderson 
discovered that the check was stolen. (T 63-64). He confronted 
Ana, asking her if she was Christy [Cotner], the owner of the 
check. Ana answered honestly, telling him "no." (T 118, 120). 
Richard Anderson indicated that there was a problem with the check. 
(T 120). Wondering what was wrong, Ana hoped Eric would assist 
her. Eric offered no explanation. (T 121). 
When police officer Jason Snow arrived, he questioned Ana 
about her actions. Ana told the officer about how Ms. O'Neill had 
bragged about her accessibility to the checks. (T 122). Ana also 
indicated that Ms. O'Neill loaned her the checkbook. (T 96). Ana 
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tried to explain the entire chain of events but felt that Snow had 
already prejudged the incident. (T 121-22, 129). 
According to officer Snow, Ana said that O'Neill had 
"passed" the checks and invited Ana to try it. (T 97). Ana did 
not, however, use the word "fraudulent" during their discussion, nor 
did she indicate that she knew something was wrong with the checks. 
(T 98). Nevertheless, Snow admitted that he imputed such a meaning 
into Ana's statements. (T 97). 
The owner of the checkbook, Christy Cotner, testified that 
she lost it "[i]n Graphic Expressions at the West Valley Mall." 
(T 76). She suspected a dark haired man of the theft. (T 87-88) . 
When Ms. Cotner arrived at Smith's, she identified Eric as the same 
dark haired man suspected of the theft. (T 79, 88). Ms. Cotner 
made clear, however, that she had never met Ana Gonzalez before. 
(T 79). 
At trial, Ms. Gonzalez objected to the court's decision to 
exclude Jeff Phillips' testimony. (T 137, 162). Mr. Phillips would 
have testified about the bragging by Shannon O'Neill, statements 
bearing a direct relationship on Ms. Gonzalez's state of mind. Ana 
Gonzalez also objected to the admission of Exhibit 4, Christy 
Cotner's checkbook. (T 82). She further moved to dismiss the case 
for lack of sufficient evidence, particularly in regards to the 
element of intent. (T 131). Ms. Gonzalez's other objection 
addressed the inadequacy of the reasonable doubt instruction. 
(T 164). The trial court denied all the objections. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The State did not prove that Ana Gonzalez acted with a 
purpose to defraud. While Ms. Gonzalez may have completed the check 
of another, she acted only in good faith and pursuant to perceived 
authority. Ms. Gonzalez's actions, though admittedly foolish, did 
not amount to criminal conduct. Moreover, the State failed to 
disprove the existence of the said authority. 
The trial court's exclusion of Jeff Phillips' testimony 
constituted prejudicial error. Since his statements would have 
corroborated the defendant's "good faith reliance" defense, they 
were relevant evidence which the jury should have considered. 
Mr. Phillips' testimony was offered to show its affect on the 
listener (the defendant) and was critical to proving the lack of 
criminal intent. 
The trial court's inclusion of the checkbook was similarly 
prejudicial because of its potential to confuse or mislead the jury 
on issues not relevant to proof of the crime charged. The State 
only charged Ms. Gonzalez with forging one check. Because no other 
charges were filed and absent proof linking the defendant with the 
other writings in the checkbook, the checkbook as a whole (as 
opposed to the involved check) was irrelevant to proof of the 
de fendant's intent. 
The reasonable doubt instruction, though upheld in State v. 
Pedersen, 150 Utah Adv. Rep. 10 (Utah App. 1990), should be 
reconsidered in light of Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. , 112 




THE STATE DID NOT PROVE THAT THE DEFENDANT ACTED WITH 
THE PURPOSE TO DEFRAUD 
"Ordinarily in proving the crime of forgery the state must 
show that the defendant not only used the name of another, but must 
also show that he did so without any authority so to do." State v. 
Collins, 597 P.2d 1317 (1979); see also State v. Jones. 81 Utah 503, 
20 P.2d 614 (1933) ("To establish falsity it must be made to appear 
not only that the person whose name is signed to the instrument did 
not sign it but also that his name was signed without authority"). 
In its attempt to prove this lack of authority, the State in the 
case at bar showed only that the check holder, Christy Cotner, did 
not allow Ms, Gonzalez to use her checking account. (T 78-79). In 
short, the State alleged, Ms. Gonzalez misrepresented herself and 
committed "forgery" when she signed Ms. Cotner#s name. (T 38). 
For purposes of this appeal,4 Ana Gonzalez concedes that on 
January 21, 1990, she intentionally completed a writing (the $300 
check) which purported to be the act of another. Cf. (T 48, 62). 
Nevertheless, one element not proven by the State was the "purpose 
to defraud." See (R 52, 60, 63). As discussed below, intentionally 
completing the check of another is not the same as acting with the 
intent to defraud: 
To prove that an accused person signed the name of 
another to an instrument, and that he passed such 
instrument as genuine, does not prove the commission 
See supra note 3. 
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of a crime. It must be shown that it was a false 
instrument, and this is not proven until it is shown 
that the person who signed another's name did so 
without authority. Until the proof is made, it is not 
shown to be a false instrument, and the defendant is 
not put to his proof at all. 
Collins, 597 P.2d at 1319 (Maughan, J., dissenting) (citation 
omitted). 
In the present case, Ana Gonzalez used the check only after 
obtaining seemingly valid authority from Shannon O'Neill. (T 112). 
Since Shannon had reportedly used her sister's checking account on a 
loan type basis, Ana believed that any amount recedved from the 
check would be returned eventually to Christy by Shannon. Moreover, 
Ana's own past dealings with her mother contributed greatly to a 
belief that such transactions were not unlawful. (T 105-06, 
133-34). 
If criminal culpability did exist, it should have been 
shouldered only by Shannon O'Neill. Christy Cotner did not 
authorize Shannon to use the checkbook, a fact undisputed and 
stressed repeatedly by the State. (T 79). The lack of Christy's 
authority, however, did not negate the perceived existence of 
Shannon's authority. Since forgery requires the specific intent to 
defraud, Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501, Ana's belief in Shannon's claims 
made her actions foolish—but not criminal. Even if Shannon did not 
in fact possess the requisite authority, the State still failed to 
disprove Ana's reliance on Shannon's claims. See State v. Wood, 648 
P.2d 71, 82 n.7 (Utah 1981) ("Unlike some other jurisdictions, Utah 
imposes on the prosecution the burden to disprove the existence of 
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affirmative defenses beyond a reasonable doubt once the defendant 
has produced some evidence of the defense"). 
All the State proved was that Ana completed the writing of 
another. If she had intended to defraud the grocery store, she 
would not have waited patiently by the checkstand while everyone 
else around her sought to leave. (T 68, 71, 73, 119). At the very 
least, she would have selected an item for herself. Instead, Ana 
cooperated readily with the management, complying with all of their 
requests. (T 73). 
Perhaps in a civil context, Ana's naivete" would have made 
her personally liable for the amount written on the check. In a 
criminal proceeding, however, the State must do more than show 
foolishness. Cf. State v. Tebbs, 786 P.2d 775, 778 (Utah App. 1990) 
(noting "the Legislature's disinclination to criminalize merely 
negligent misrepresentations or omissions"); see also (R 61). The 
prosecution must prove the "intent to defraud." See (R 52, 60, 
63). Having failed to do so, the State fell short of its burden. 
Cf. State v. Gorham. 87 Utah 86, 48 P.2d 447 (1935) ("To establish 
[forgery], it must be made td appear that the instrument so uttered 
and passed by the defendant was false and forged, and, further, that 
the defendant knew of its falsity when he uttered it"); State v. 
Jensen, 103 Utah 478, 136 P.2d 949 (1943). 
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN EXCLUDING THE NONHEARSAY 
TESTIMONY OF THE DEFENSE WITNESS 
"'Hearsay7 is a statement, other than one made by the 
declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in 
evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." Utah R. 
Evid. 801(c). If, however, a statement reflects an individual's 
"state of mind" or is indicative of the affect it had on the 
listener, the otherwise inadmissible statement may still be 
admitted. Id. (these type of statements would not be offered "to 
prove the truth of the matter asserted"); State v. Sorensen, 617 
P.2d 333, 337 (Utah 1980) ("When an out-of-court statement is 
offered simply to prove that it was made, without regard to whether 
it is true, such testimony is not proscribed by the hearsay rule"); 
cf. State v. DiBello. 780 P.2d 1221, 1228 (Utah 1989) ("Hearsay 
evidence that shows a defendant's mental state prior to the 
commission of a crime is admissible under evidence rule 803(3) 
if . . . it is relevant to prove or explain acts or conduct of the 
defendant"). 
In the present case, the trial court erred when it refused 
to admit the testimony of Jeff Phillips. (T 162). In response to 
the hearsay objection by the State, Ms. Gonzalez emphasized that 
Mr. Phillips7 testimony bore directly upon her state of mind. 
(T 162-63). Hence, it was not offered to prove the truth of the 
matter asserted. Indeed, Mr. Phillips testimony would have 
supported the finding that Ana acted only in good faith and in 
- 12 -
accordance with perceived (versus actual) authority. Cf. State v. 
Collins, 597 P.2d 1317 (Utah 1979) (citations omitted) ("It is not 
forgery for one to write another's name with authority"); State v. 
Sorensen, 617 P.2d 333, 337 (Utah 1980) ("Evidence of a statement by 
a third person is therefore admissible, . . . if it is offered to 
support a defense of good faith"). 
United States v. Eisenstein, 731 F.2d 1540 (11th Cir. 
1984), illustrates how important such "hearsay" statements are to an 
individual's defense. In Eisenstein, "a jury convicted appellants 
of conspiracy to defraud the United States . . . and felonious 
failure to file [income] reports with the [I.R.S.]." Id. at 1542. 
"The jury, however, was deprived of evidence that was relevant, 
indeed crucial, to its determination of whether [appellants acted in 
good faith]." Id. at 1544. "A defendant charged with violating the 
reporting statute can attempt to negate proof of specific intent by 
establishing the defense of good faith reliance on advice of 
counsel." Id. at 1543. Consequently, when the trial court excluded 
"hearsay" testimony supportive of appellants7 good faith intentions, 
it committed reversible error. Eisenstein, 731 F.2d at 1546. 
Moreover, the appellate court held, the excluded testimony 
could not be considered "cumulative of evidence already before the 
jury." Id. at 1546. Despite the fact that the appellant "testified 
as to the substance of his conversations with the lawyer and, in any 
case, because the attorneys for both sides [made related arguments 
to] the jury . . . ," id., the Eisenstein Court could not deem the 
error harmless: 
- 13 -
even though it might be true that appellants would 
have been convicted for the lack of credibility of 
their only defense, the harm in having been denied 
such a defense is highlighted by the fact that, weak 
as it might have been, reliance on advice of counsel 
was appellants' only defense. The evidence of full 
disclosure, consisting entirely of [appellant's] 
unsupported testimony, could have been corroborated by 
his lawyer. The trial judge's failure to permit this 
highly relevant testimony cannot be dismissed as 
harmless error. 
731 F.2d at 1546. Not overlooked by this holding was the Court's 
recognition that "Ample evidence supported the convictions." Id. at 
1542. Yet, because the excluded testimony focused on the critical 
element of intent, the Eisenstein Court reversed the conviction. 
Error also existed in the case at bar. The State and 
Ms. Gonzalez both recognized that Ana's defense focused on her 
intent. (Cf. 147) (wherein during closing argument the State 
admits, "It appears that there's only one element in dispute and 
that is the mental intent of the Defendant"). By excluding Jeff 
Phillips testimony, the trial court eliminated relevant and 
corroborating evidence on the most disputed fact of the trial. The 
jury should have been able to» consider the testimony supportive of 
Ms. Gonzalez's "good faith reliance" defense. Cf. United States v. 
Eisenstein, 731 F.2d 1540, 1546 (11th Cir. 1984) (even though the 
excluded "testimony might not have been credible . . . the issue was 
one for the jury to decide . . . .") 
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POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT ADMITTED THE STOLEN 
CHECKBOOK INTO EVIDENCE 
"Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.11 Utah 
R. Evid. 402. At trial, Ms. Gonzalez argued that the checkbook 
(Exhibit 4) was irrelevant to the proceedings because no connection 
had been made between her actions and the checkbook as a whole (as 
opposed to the single check [Exhibit 1]). (T 82). The trial court 
rejected Ms. Gonzalez's argument, finding that since she was in 
possession of the checkbook, the checkbook related to her state of 
mind. (T 85). 
If the State had charged Ana with a crime relating to 
possession or with some type of accomplice liability, the trial 
court's ruling may have had merit. However, since the State charged 
Ms. Gonzalez with only one count of forgery, (R 52), and failed to 
prove or even allege criminal involvement by Ana in the theft of 
Ms. Cotner's checkbook, no relevant nexus existed. Cf. (T 159) 
(wherein the State admitted that "She's [Ms. Gonzalez] not charged 
with theft of this checkbook. She's not charged with anything other 
than passing this check [#1923]").5 Absent a more appropriate 
foundation, nothing other than check #1923 (Exhibit 1) should have 
been admitted. 
5
 The State presented no handwriting expert, nor did it 
lay a foundation connecting Ms. Gonzalez to the other checks. 
Indeed, no witness for the State, including Ms. Cotner, knew who had 
forged the other checks. 
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The trial court's error was especially prejudicial because, 
as Ms. Cotner's testimony revealed, somebody had clearly practiced 
forging her signature. (T 78). Ana Gonzalez was not that 
"somebody," though, a fact evidenced by the State's unwillingness to 
charge Ana with any other crime. See (T 159). If the State had 
suspected Ms. Gonzalez of involvement extending beyond her actions 
at Smith's, they would have charged her under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-2-202 (accomplice liability), Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408 (theft 
by receiving stolen property), and/or Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-502 
(possession of forged writing). 
Based on a lack of evidence, however, or the belief that 
she was not actually responsible for writing on the other checks, 
the State apparently viewed Ana's conduct in isolation and as 
falling outside the scope of such potentially applicable crimes. 
See (T 159). Consequently, the jury should not have considered what 
the State failed to allege. 
Merely possessing the checkbook, without more, was a fact 
inconsequential to proof of the crime charged. Admitting the 
checkbook may have misled or confused the jury into considering 
facts of crimes not at issue or alleged by the State. "'[W]here 
evidence [is] shown to have supported only conjectural inferences 
which had little probative value, or where no evidence was adduced 
that showed that a fact had any causal connection with the [crime 
charged],' reversal may be appropriate on 'grounds that the 
improperly admitted evidence could only have served to confuse and 
- 16 -
mislead the jury or to prejudice the outcome of the case.7" State 
v. DeAlo, 748 P.2d 194, 199 (Utah App. 1987) (citation omitted). 
Alternatively, assuming, arguendo
 f that the checkbook was 
somehow relevant, its probative value was nonetheless "substantially 
outweighed [for reasons similar to those stated above] by the danger 
of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the 
jury . . . " Utah R. Evid. 403. The trial court erred in admitting 
the checkbook. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING THE DEFENDANTS 
REASONABLE DOUBT INSTRUCTION 
In State v. Pedersen. 150 Utah Adv. Rep. 10 (Utah App. 
1990), this Court upheld a reasonable doubt instruction identical to 
the one questioned in the case at bar. Absent from the Pedersen 
analysis, however, were two important considerations. First, 
everything reasoned by the Pedersen Court could have also applied to 
a civil (clear and convincing) standard. Secondly, Cage v. 
Louisiana, 498 U.S. , 112 L.Ed.2d 339, 111 S.Ct. (1990) (per 
curiam), a recent decision not considered by the Pedersen Court, 
struck down a reasonable doubt instruction substantially similar to 
the one questioned in the case at bar. 
Because of the similarities6 between the Cage instruction 
and the Pedersen instruction, the Pedersen instruction should also 
be rejected. Just as the Cage decision could not allow a 
6
 Both instructions have a presumption of innocence 
clause; both instructions mandate acquittal if the State fails to 
meet its burden of proof; -[footnote cont'd on next page]-
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"reasonable doubt" to be self-defining,7 it is not enough for the 
Pedersen instruction to state "that the State's proof must obviate 
all reasonable doubt." Moreover, while equating a reasonable doubt 
to the more weighty affairs of life may be improper, the language 
approved in Pedersen, "[p]roof beyond a reasonable doubt is that 
degree of proof which satisfies the mind, convinces the 
understanding of those who are bound to act conscientiously upon 
it . . ." appears no better. The language could also apply to the* 
"clear and convincing" civil standard and is just as deficient as 
the "more weighty affairs of life" language. Finally, both Cage and 
Pedersen did not require proof to an absolute certainty, nor did 
either preclude the use of the "mere possibility" language. 
Perhaps, most importantly, the Cage opinion did not perform 
a "harmless error" analysis. Unwilling to place itself in the role 
of factfinder for each and every criminal appeal, the Cage opinion 
noted that the reasonable doubt instruction "is a prime instrument 
for reducing the risk of convictions resting on factual error[,]" 
and apparently left that task to the jury. 
6 -[cont'd]- both instructions do not require proof to an 
absolute certainty; both instructions require the doubt to be 
reasonable, or based on reason; Cage condemns doubts based on "mere 
caprice and conjecture"; Pedersen disallows doubts which are "merely 
fanciful or imaginary or based on a wholly speculative possibility"; 
and both instructions state that the doubt must be a doubt that a 
reasonable person could entertain. Compare Pedersen, 150 Utah Adv. 
Rep. at 12 with State v. Cage, 554 So.2d 39, 41 (La. 1989). 
7
 Cage implicitly rejected the argument that the term, 
"reasonable doubt," is self-defining. Despite the repeated 
references to a "reasonable doubt," the Court struck down the 
instruction. 
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In sum, reversible error occurred when the trial court 
rejected Ms. Gonzalez's proposed instruction in favor of a 
constitutionally defective instruction. The need for a properly 
worded reasonable doubt instruction was critical for the jury in the 
present case because the State's "proof" of criminal intent was 
questionable at best. Pedersen should be reexamined in light of the 
recent United States Supreme Court decision. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse his 
conviction for lack of sufficient evidence or, in the alternative, 
reverse and remand this case for a new trial. 
SUBMITTED this S day of February, 1991. 
LISA J. RE^AL 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
itw £ 
RONALD S. FUJINO 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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ADDENDUM A 
76-2-202. Criminal responsibility for direct commission of 
offense or for conduct of another. 
Every person, acting with the mental state required for the commission of 
an offense who directly commits the offense, who solicits, requests, commands, 
encourages, or intentionally aids another person to engage in conduct which 
coStitutes an offense shall be criminally liable as a party for such conduct. 
76-6-408. Receiving stolen property — Duties of pawnbro-
kers. 
(1) A person commits theft if he receives, retains, or disposes of the property 
of another knowing that it has been stolen, or believing that it probably has 
been stolen, or who conceals, sells, withholds or aids in concealing, selling or 
f o l d i n g any such property from the owner, knowing the property to be 
stolen, with a purpose to deprive the owner thereof. 
76-6-501. Forgery — "Writing" defined. 
(1) A person is guilty of forgery if, with purpose to defraud anyone, or with 
knowledge that he is facilitating a fraud to be perpetrated by anyone, he: 
(a) Alters any writing of another without his authority or utters any 
such altered writing; or 
(b) Makes, completes, executes, authenticates, issues, transfers, pub-
lishes, or utters any writing so that the writing or the making, comple-
tion, execution, authentication, issuance, transference, publication or ut-
terance purports to be the act'of another, whether the person is existent 
or nonexistent, or purports to have been executed at a time or place or in 
a numbered sequence other than was in fact the case, or to be a copy of an 
original when no such original existed. 
(2) As used in this section "writing" includes printing or any other method 
of recording information, checks, tokens, stamps, seals, credit cards, badges, 
trademarks, money, and any other symbols of value, right, privilege, or iden-
tification. 
(3) Forgery is a felony of the second degree if the writing is or purports to 
be: 
(a) A security, revenue stamp, or any other instrument or writing is-
sued by a government, or any agency thereof; or 
(b) A check with a face amount of $100 or more, an issue of stocks, 
bonds, or any other instrument or writing representing an interest in or 
claim against property, or a pecuniary interest in or claim against any 
person or enterprise. 
76-6-502. Possession of forged writing or device for writ-
ing. 
Any person who, with intent to defraud, knowingly possesses any writing 
that is a forgery as defined in Section 76-6-501, or who with intent to defraud 
knowingly possesses any device for making any such writing, is guilty of a 
felony of the third degree, except where the altering, making, completion, 
execution, issuance, transfer, publication, or utterance of such writing would 
constitute a class A misdemeanor, in which event the possession of the writing 
or device for making such a writing shall constitute a class A misdemeanor. 
Rule 402. Relevant evidence generally admissible; irrele-
vant evidence inadmissible. 
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the 
Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the state of Utah, 
statute, or by these rules, or by other rules applicable in courts of this state. 
Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible. 
Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of 
prejudice, confusion, or waste of time. 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is sub-
stantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the is-
sues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of 
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 
HEARSAY. 
Rule 801. Definitions. 
The following definitions apply under this article: 
(a) Statement. A "statement" is (1) an oral or written assertion or (2) 
nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by him as an assertion. 
(b) Declarant. A "declarant" is a person who makes a statement 
(c) Hearsay. "Hearsay" is a statement, other than one made by the 
declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to 
prove the truth of the matter asserted. 
Rule 803. Hearsay exceptions; availability of declarant im-
material. 
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declar-
ant is available as a witness: 
(1) Present sense impression. A statement describing or explaining 
an event or condition made while the declarant was perceiving the event 
or condition or immediately thereafter. 
(2) Excited utterance. A statement relating to a startling event or 
condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement 
caused by the event or condition. 
(3) Then existing mental, emotional, or physical condition. A 
statement of the declarant's then existing state of mind, emotion, sensa-
tion, or physical condition (such as intent, plan, motive, design, mental 
feeling, pain, and bodily health), but not including a statement of memory 
or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed unless it relates to the 
execution, revocation, identification, or terms of declarant's will. 
